As educators, we are aiming to achieve a wide range of goals, such as: to process information or feelings about Israel in broader perspectives, explore Israel's strategic and moral dilemmas, enhance identification and connection with Israel, bring Israeli ideals, ideas, and reality, as well as engaging at times in Israel Advocacy. Each to his or her own directions, and the Jewish Agency Education Department, together with other organizations, offers new  didactic resources to help grapple with many of these issues and guide programming in both formal and informal settings.
 
Here, we suggest how to present and review the 2006 war with Hizbullah in terms of its immediate and broader strategic context . We do so from an awareness that factual knowledge can be patchy, while media impressions are overwhelming and anti-Israel - complicated by the abundance of information and disputed perspectives. We made decisions about where to begin and end, how to summarize it in strategic and contemporary terms, what events to highlight. We hope that these and the relevant links, analysis and documents will facilitate your own educational coverage.

A. Historical & Strategic Context

Summary from May 2000-July 2006

After May 2000, Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon to the International Border, Israel's compliance with UN Security Council Resolutions was internationally recognized, while Syria did not comply, continuing to dominate Lebanon,  and encouraging Hizbullah's continued entrenchment and expansion of capabilities in S. Lebanon. Lebanon also refused to deploy the Lebanese Army in southern Lebanon, in violation of UN Resolutions.
The ambush and kidnapping of 3 Israeli soldiers inside Israel's northern border and 1 civilian, in October 2000, under the eyes of UNIFIL and with their complicity, was not challenged strongly by Israel. Their unknown fate became a tool in a psychological war waged by Hizbullah for 3 years, while appeals to UNIFIL and the Red Cross bore no fruit. In 2003, through international intermediaries, Israel conducted a controversial exchange of a large number of prisoners and cadavers for the return of the bodies of the 3 deceased soldiers and Elhanan Tannenbaum.  

In 2004, the UN Security Council finally passed Resolutions #1553 and #1559, forcing Syria to demilitarize in Lebanon, but leaving behind the Hizbullah hegemony with its supply route from Iran via Syria, as well as other Syrian personnel.

NB: While the USA listed Hizbullah as a terrorist organization, the enlarged EU of refused to do so, preventing definitive international action to break Hizbullah's Iranian-Syrian connection and supply lines by air, land and sea.

Security  & Intelligence

Israel was aware of the importance of the Syrian-Iranian supply axis to Hizbullah, and of the latter's attempts to export its techniques and technologies to the Gaza Strip; there was continued tension along Israel's northern border, where Hizbullah had established strongholds and threatened to kidnap Israeli soldiers.

There was also an Israeli assessment that Katyusha rockets had a greater range potential, posing a threat to Israel's civilian population in that area. However, the northern border did not appear to be an operational priority in terms of conflict or intelligence, although strategic analyses recognized its significance in a  time of conflict.

There were no operative military or civilian contingency plans; there were known to be serious shortfalls in most of the projects to upgrade or build civil defense facilities.
Israel focused on diplomatic efforts to address the Iranian and Syrian threats, but its main energies were engaged in: internal issues; coalition crises; Disengagement; Realignment; events in, and rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip.

It is now obvious in retrospect that Israel's military intelligence in Lebanon was gravely compromised after May 2000. In July 2006, after the ambush of 2 Israeli soldiers inside Israel's northern border, Israel lacked accurate intelligence about Hizbullah and discovered their capacity only under missile bombardment, as follows:

that the scale of Hizbullah activity and entrenchment had escalated exponentially, as well as the stockpile of grad rockets;
that there were 12,000 Iranian ballistic missiles, and Iranian missile operators;
that Hizbullah's operational capacity was highly skilled.

However,  these all appear to have been "unknowns".

Points to Ponder

• In the era of satellite intelligence that should have picked up Hizbullah's missile deliveries and armaments, why was Hizbullah not listed as a terrorist organization? Why was it not censored? Why was it permitted to amass such power unchallenged?
• Had it known about them, could Israel have better defended its northern sector against relatively sophisticated wide scale missile bombardment?
• What would Israel's options have been during the interim period, or in mid-July 2006, had this intelligence been available earlier, in part or in whole?
• Hypothetically speaking, did Israel have related intelligence and choose to challenge and expose Hizbullah's strategic threat, sooner rather than later?
• An entirely separate question is:
  Why did Israel not make and implement adequate civil defense provisions and contingency plans, based on known  information? 

B. Conflict

Timelines give details, but it is the educator's narrative that attributes texture.  The Summer War can be divided into definite phases, both in terms of its conceptualization and its geographical dimensions, but it demands to be examined in terms of the imperative to defend Israel's civilian population from aerial bombardment, aswell as the effectiveness of field operations, and their representation. The following is an impressionistic and composite overview without all the dates; references here for the main points give far greater detail. Further facets of the basic story are set out in sections #C-E, with  the ceasefire, the kidnapped soldiers, Media representation, and personal stories, appearing in later chapters.

One should recall the Hamas kidnapping of Corporal Gilad Shalit from inside sovereign Israeli territory to the Gaza Strip, the attempt to smuggle him into Egypt, for transfer to Hizbullah, and various acknowledged moves by Palestinian terrorist factions to import Hizbullah technology by sea, as evidenced by Katyusha bombardments on Ashkelon,  Qassams on Sderot, and Israel's southern region.
Hizbullah's incursion into sovereign Israeli territory along the northern border, through a diversion attack on the IDF with high fatalities and the simultaneous kidnap of soldiers Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev, was a sequel to many attempts by that organization to seize hostages as a psychological bargaining counter with Israel. Israel responded in self-defense to the diversionary attack and to the kidnap, targeting Hizbullah strongholds right on and close to Israel's border and with a small ground force. At this stage, there was considerable tension and a state of alert and the goal was to bring home the hostages and knock-out Hizbullah. The Hizbullah-Syria-Iran supply line was hit and, more important, exposed to the world: Hizbullah's leader appeared shaken.

Hizbullah's initial response was missile bombardment of civilian life across Israel's entire north, to a depth of 40km, continuing for hours, and emanating from deeper within Lebanon, as well as from near Israel's border. 1.6 million Israelis lived in this  area and civil defense shelters were inadequate in numbers and quality for continued existence;  there were no operational plans to support civilians under such circumstances; tens of thousands of Israelis moved to central Israel in the course of a few days. An Israeli Navy frigate on ops. off the Lebanese coast suffered a major strike by Hizbullah using Lebanese Army coastal defense systems.

Foreign media reporting became a central feature in the war, often disclosing information about Israeli targets to Hizbullah and highlighting civilian refugees in Lebanon only. The IDF was  on high alert and the IAF went on 24/7 sorties to target Hizbullah installations, initially as far as the Beka'a Valley. There were initial successes, but missile bombardment continued and Israel's northern residents spent days and nights in bomb shelters, and the economy came to a standstill across northern Israel. Strong messages of support for Israel in its tremendous civilian hardship were broadcast by the UJC and UJIA who raised funds for projects to help stricken communities in Israel's North. Israel's southern border with the Gaza Strip calmed down considerably as international media attention switched to the North.
 
Despite Israel's targeted attacks and expectations for an operation lasting only several days, Hizbullah's operational capacity was not seriously affected: Israel announced several mobilization call-ups, at first sending ground forces into Lebanon to a depth of a few kilometers to seek out Hizbullah, while expanding the radius of IAF air strikes to detected missile sources.  Statements of confidence by Israeli leaders showed a change of goals. There were international calls for a ceasefire, but without a mechanism to ensure Israel's security, remove the Hizbullah threat, and return the hostages, Israel rejected the idea. Lebanon refused to cooperate. Operational shortfalls became evident inIsraeli logistics, equipment, and command. Along the poorly equipped northern home front, more civilians left, voluntary organizations geared up to full capacity with food, hospitality, gifts; the UJC-Jewish Agency and AJJDC mobilized projects in and for northern communities with youth projects, educational programmes, respite kaytanot and tours, equipment, etc.

Along with the will to fight and defend, criticism was already emerging in Israel from the moment that the war in Lebanon deepened without preventing missile bombardment on Israel's cities, villages and kibbutzim. It was addressed at the political and military leadership as well as the operational and executive. This phase is marked by Israel's intensification of air strikes as far as the Hizbullah stronghold in S. Beirut  and its deepening of ground operations, moving towards the R. Litani. Foreign media had a field day on Israel's targeting of S. Lebanon's infrastructure that supplied Hizbullah and the ground operation to clear out its strongholds in small villages, and was complicit in the publication of highly inflated figures, falsified data and faked photos, which impacted severely on Israel's image. Israel deeply regretted its tragic error in Kafr Qana costing Lebanese civilian life, but no regret was received over Israeli civilian casualties and destruction. Most of Israel's operations were legitimately directed at Hizbullah's concealments in civilian populations, but at also at a high cost of lives in the IDF: most of Hizbullah's deliberate Israeli targets were civilian. US, UN and EU efforts to broker a ceasefire were in high gear.

As the ceasefire terms were drafted and revised at the UN, Israel changed its mind about stopping where it was in Lebanon: both Israel and Hizbullah made last ditch attempts for strategic positions between the Litani River and Israel's border, while missile bombardment continued at a lower level. The ceasefire included a strengthened and operational international force, references to the release of kidnapped soldiers, Lebanese sovereignty and deployment, disarming Hizbullah. As it went into force on 14th August, and Israel began preparations for withdrawal, 2 Western journalists were kidnapped in the Gaza Strip.

Points to Ponder

• What constitutes an effective and representative narrative? Build a Timeline with dates and points, to create your own narrative.
• What did Israel achieve/not achieve?
• What was the real cost to Israel in terms of Israeli society and the country as a whole?
• Was a war inevitable?
• Can the story be told without addressing media images?

To Annotated Links

C. Maps

It's easier to narrate a story in maps and images but  it can be even more effective to use them with a few choice words. Use them, also to illustrate background to the War, along a Timeline, or to present major points in the Arab-Israel Conflict. Please bear in mind that all the following maps are copyright, so you may not publish them in any medium without permission.

To Annotated Links

D. Visual Documentation  [© to each contributor]

We heard many comments that it was impossible to see Israel's side of the story from the media. There are many clips and images online, so the problem is really where to find reputable sources for them. Caution: Use as appropriate for audience and age group.
We can add emphatic layers to the outline story using images while using them to provide authentic documentation of these events. Music and song are also part of the story of this war.
At the same time, below are some links that demonstrate very clearly to what extent fraudulent montages have been used, impacting on our conscious and sub-conscious picture of the Hizbullah-Israel war.

To Annotated Links

E. Statements about the War

For six years, Israel's leaders engaged on the diplomatic level in matters relating to Lebanon and Hizbullah; in mid-July 2006, this changed.

Posturing, firm stances and playing one's advantages are part of the repertoire of leaders and public figures. Official statements, TV and radio interviews have multiple purposes, since they are by definition for both internal and external consumption in the post-modern era. From those on the Israeli side, too, we can measure: the temperature of the region, the pulse of the war, the atmosphere in the Israeli government, differences of emphasis and opinion. With hindsight,  we can also attribute credibility, but it would be premature to come to conclusions about responsibility or career from these statements….

Points to Ponder

Below is a selection of speeches that appeared over the course of the war; working on the basis of those speeches available, and by exploring a few paragraphs of each, we can poinpoint and discuss the above-mentioned factors, as well as compare the speaker's messages at different points in time.

To Annotated Links